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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
His heart was steadily beating faster and his palms were 
beginning to sweat.1  Even though he was an experienced 
highwayman, he never lost the nervousness that came right before he 
approached his victims.  Perched atop his horse and shielded from 
view by the trees, he could see the coach approaching and could 
already tell that this meeting would yield enough to last him a month 
if he were to succeed.  As the coach came around the bend, he took 
one quick breath, quickly pulled his mask over his face, and in one 
swift motion galloped forward from his hiding place amongst the 
trees to block the path.  “Stop, and hand over your belongings!” he 
shouted, brandishing his pistol.  The travelers, almost frozen in fear, 
slowly got out and emptied their pockets. 
The above is a fictional account of a highway robbery during 
England’s early days.  Dating from the medieval times and into the 
nineteenth
 
century, England’s roads were ripe with highwaymen 
ready to take advantage of unsuspecting travelers.2  In those days, 
robberies were much simpler—they occurred on the open highways 
and the victim knew exactly what was being taken.  Today, in a 
world of free-flowing information and technology, things are much 
less simple.  In an age in which intangible items, such as information, 
have as much value as tangible items, thieves have turned their focus 
from the real-world highway to the information highway.   
The advent of technology and the Internet has brought 
unprecedented change to life as we know it.3  Today, we 
                                                          
1 This is an imagined account of a highway robbery in eighteenth century 
England.  See Rictor Norton, Highwaymen: Jack Hawkins, Sixteen-String Jack & 
Gentleman James Maclean, THE GEORGIAN UNDERWORLD, 
http://rictornorton.co.uk/gu08.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2012). 
2 Highwaymen of the Peak, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/ 
eastmidlands/series3/travellers_highwaymen_derbyshire_peakdistrict.shtml (last 
updated Mar. 2006). 
3 In response to predictions that “[c]ommerce and business will shift from 
offices and malls to networks and modems,” author Clifford Stoll once commented: 
“Baloney. Do our computer pundits lack all common sense?  The truth i[s] no 
online database will replace your daily newspaper . . . and no computer network 
will change the way government works.”  Clifford Stoll, The Internet? Bah!, 
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 1995), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek 
/1995/02/26/the-internet-bah.html.  Time has proven these comments false.  
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communicate through the use of email and Skype; we buy products 
online; and we bank online.4  The Internet has become a source that 
keeps us informed of current events, facilitates commercial 
transactions, and provides a means for social interaction.  However, 
the Internet is a double-edged sword.  Although it has made our lives 
easier in many respects, it has also created new problems.  One of the 
merits of the Internet—the free flow of information—is also one of 
its greatest flaws.  Anyone with the proper know-how can gain access 
to a user’s most personal and valuable information.5  In addition, 
these hackers can range from your average suburban kid to 
government agencies.6  Unlike in the past, the things a person may 
                                                          
Indeed, few could have predicted the leaps and bounds that have been made by 
technology and the Internet.  See id. 
4 Not only has the Internet changed our daily lives, it has also changed the 
way government works.  Technology has forced government to work within the 
framework of the cyber world.  Most notably, the Obama campaign in 2008 relied 
heavily on the Internet to reach out to voters.  See Steve Schifferes, Internet Key to 
Obama Victories, BBC NEWS (June 12, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7412045.stm; See also Claire Cain Miller, How 
Obama’s Internet Campaign Changed Politics, NEW YORK TIMES BITS (Nov. 7, 
2008, 7:49 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/how-obamas-internet-
campaign-changed-politics/. 
5 Because of the nature of the Internet, it is impossible not to store any 
information about oneself online.  Whether it be on a social networking site, on 
online banking, or on an Amazon account, each person has left some amount of 
personal information on the Internet.  This, in turn, makes people more susceptible 
to identity theft.  In fact, there is a huge market for stolen credit card numbers.  
Stolen cards, along with the names and addresses on the card, are sold on forums 
for those who know where to look and are sold for about five to ten dollars apiece.  
See Nick Bilton, How Credit Card Data Is Stolen and Sold, NEW YORK TIMES 
(May 3, 2011, 3:30 P.M.), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/card-data-is-
stolen-and-sold/.  
6 Early in 2012, it was reported that a group of high school juniors in 
southern California had hacked into their teacher’s computers in order to change 
the grades of students who were willing to pay for their “services.”  See Dennis 
Romero, Rich Kids Hack Computers to Change Grades at Palos Verdes High but 
are Busted by Cops, L.A. WEEKLY BLOGS (Jan. 27, 2012, 12:32 PM), 
http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2012/01/palos_verdes_grade_change_computer
_scandal_high_school.php. 
In contrast, some hackers operate for the government and gather 
information as intelligence.  See Tabassum Zakaria, U.S. Blames China, Russia for 
Cyber Espionage, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/03/us-usa-cyber-china-
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own today are not only limited to physical forms.  In this 
technological age, a person’s possessions may also take on a digital 
form; and with this transition from the physical to the digital has 
come a stealthier form of theft that is much different from face-to-
face hold-ups.  Unlike the days of yore, the online security breaches 
of the modern age happen right under the victim’s nose without her 
knowledge, and it is often difficult to realize the full extent of the 
harm until much, much later.7 
With the pattern of current events, it is even more difficult to 
ignore the growing problem of security breaches.  A security breach 
that has recently garnered much attention in the press is the hacker 
group Anonymous’s breach into think-tank Stratfor’s database.8  The 
hacking group was able to obtain the email addresses and other 
personal data of Stratfor’s 860,000 subscribers, which included high-
profile government officials.9  The result was not only a nightmare 
for the subscribers, but for the United States as well, with an analyst 
for independent research institute, U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, 
John Bumgarner stating, “[w]e can assume that a foreign intelligence 
service has already taken advantage of this information.”10  To add 
insult to injury, it was later discovered that Stratfor’s data protection 
                                                          
idUSTRE7A23FX20111103.  In 2011, the U.S. accused China and Russia of 
engaging in cyber espionage.  Id.  It is believed that foreign countries target the 
U.S. for trade secrets in order to gain “parity with the United States”  Id.  National 
Counterintelligence Executive, Robert Bryant emphasized the danger it posed to 
the U.S., stating: “Trade secrets developed over thousands of working hours by our 
brightest minds are stolen in a split second and transferred to our competitors."  Id.     
7 American Greed: Cybercrime (CNBC television broadcast May 5, 
2010), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTVJ9rpwiFQ (Starting at 
17:39, Julie, a victim of stolen credit card information describes the effect it has 
had on her life.  She has had to spend countless hours resolving problems arising 
from theft of her information.).  See also Nicole Perlroth, Finding a Cleanup Crew 
After a Messy Hack Attack, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/technology/hacker-attacks-like-stratfors-
require-fast-response.html (“In the world of computer security, experts say, the 
most dangerous breaches are the quiet ones—the ones in which hackers make off 
with a company’s intellectual property and leave no trace.”).  
8 See Ken Dilanian, Hackers Reveal Personal Data of 860,000 Stratfor 
subscribers, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ 
jan/04/nation/la-na-cyber-theft-20120104.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
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left much to be desired.  The company’s files were unencrypted,11 
and an individual was able to crack user’s passwords using simple 
off-the-shelf software.12  Due to its faulty data protection, Stratfor 
lost highly confidential information that was costly to both its 
consumers and the country.   
This example of a security breach serves as a testament to the 
far-reaching consequences of poor data protection.  If a system does 
not have adequate data protection, it can easily be hacked.  Then, the 
hacker will gain access to information belonging to multitudes of 
people, agencies, and groups.  These recent developments beg the 
question: What does this mean for the future of America’s data 
protection practices?  Should the government play a role in regulating 
data protection to ensure that its citizens’ data are adequately 
protected? 
The current framework for U.S. data protection is based upon 
a “sectoral model” in which various laws aimed at different sectors of 
industry are used to protect personal information.  This model relies 
upon a combination of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation in 
order to protect data privacy.13  In practice, this is how the sectoral 
model works: Congress passes legislation and, through the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce, monitors the 
businesses targeted by the legislation.  However, these laws are 
narrow in scope and are careful not to infringe too much on the 
marketplace’s role in privacy regulation.14  While the model does 
include the use of legislation, it primarily relies upon industry 
practice, codes of conduct, and the marketplace in order to protect 
data privacy.15  Reliance on legislation to provide data protection is 
secondary to reliance on industry practice to protect data.16  The 
rationale is that businesses are in the best position to make data 
                                                          
11 Zoe Fox, ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Hit Security Group, CNN (Dec. 26, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/26/tech/web/anonymous-hack-
stratfor/index.html.  It appears that Anonymous targeted Stratfor because it failed 
to encrypt credit card data of its clients.  Id.  
12 Dilanian, supra note 8. 
13 See U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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privacy decisions that will suit both their needs and the needs of the 
consumer.  
Although the U.S.’s sectoral model gives businesses freer rein 
in its data collection practices by allowing businesses to pick and 
choose how to implement privacy protection laws, some have 
wondered whether the sectoral model is the better model or whether 
it is even effective at all.17  With online privacy becoming an 
increasingly hot topic,18 many are pondering whether it is time for the 
U.S. to have its own data protection agency.19  Those who call for 
change point to the European Union (EU) and its approach to data 
privacy, which is considered to be the most stringent in the world.  
Unlike the U.S.’s sectoral model, the EU’s comprehensive model 
creates expansive political rights to citizens of member states and 
gives control of personal information to the citizen.20  In this way, the 
EU model is the exact opposite of the U.S. model of data protection 
in that the latter takes control of personal information away from the 
consumer and puts it in the hands of businesses.21   
                                                          
17 See Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the 
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1999).  
18 Most notably, Facebook has recently been under fire for tracking and 
keeping logs of sites that its users visit. See Tiffany McCall, Facebook Privacy 
Concerns, WKRG-NEWS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www2.wkrg.com/news/2011/ 
nov/17/facebook-privacy-concerns-ar-2719783/.  Even more recently is the hacking 
of security group, Stratfor’s client information.  See Zoe Fox, ‘Anonymous’ 
Hackers Hit Security Group, CNN (Dec. 26, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/26/tech/web/anonymous-hack-stratfor/index.html. 
19 See generally DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK 
FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET 
ECONOMY (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf [hereinafter DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE] (In this paper, the Department of Commerce proposed a creation of 
an online data protection agency). 
20 James M. Assey & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe 
Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 150 
(2001).  
21 Fred H. Cates, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the 
European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 207–08 (1999) (“[I]n 
the United States, telephone numbers, addresses, Social Security numbers, medical 
history, and similar personal identifying data are almost always owned by someone 
else—the Post Office, the government, or a physician or hospital.”). 
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States within the EU provide their citizens with strong data 
privacy rights.22  In fact, data protection is considered a fundamental 
right guaranteed to all citizens within the EU states under a law 
called Directive 95/46/EC (Directive) that was passed in 1998.23  The 
Directive also requires companies to obtain consent from consumers 
before collecting, processing, and sharing personal information.24  
Further, this EU law allows consumers access to their information in 
order to update and change it.25  Essentially, the Directive works to 
protect personal data by giving the individual a great deal of control 
over her personal information.  Lastly, the Directive also works to 
provide security by controlling the parties with which an EU 
company may trade.26  The Directive only allows for transmission of 
data between an EU member and a non-EU party if the party has 
“adequate” data protection.27  This requirement is meant to ensure 
that data will not be transmitted to a party that will be careless with 
the information.28  The basis of the EU model is the idea that data 
                                                          
22 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, Art. 28. 1995 O.J. (L 281) (Oct. 24, 1995), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddcc1c74.html [hereinafter Data Directive]. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
28 See id.  When the Directive was first passed, many, especially the U.S., 
were in an uproar.  See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR 
BUSINESS 191–95 (1998).  The restriction on transmission of data between an EU 
country and a non-EU country had significant economic consequences, specifically 
for those in the financial industry.  Id. at 34.  Many in the U.S. were afraid that the 
EU had created this restriction in order to discriminate against foreign trading 
partners, but this matter soon blew over with the Safe Harbor Agreement in 2000.  
See id. at 191–95; see also Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/. 
The Safe Harbor Agreement allowed flow of information between the EU 
nations and the U.S. so long as U.S. businesses complied with the requirements set 
out in the agreement.  In order to qualify for Safe Harbor and trade with a business 
located in the EU, a U.S. company must fill out a form on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s website and certify that the requirements under the Safe Harbor 
agreement are met.  See Eric Shapiro, All is Not Fair in the Privacy Trade: The 
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privacy is a “political right anchored among the panoply of 
fundamental human rights and the rights attributed to ‘data subjects' 
or citizens.”29 
The EU Directive sets up the foundation of EU data privacy 
protection, but the way the Directive is enforced depends on the 
member state and how it chooses to administer the law.  Each state is 
given the freedom to decide how it will run its independent agency in 
charge of ensuring that data protection policies are being followed 
and which laws must be passed in order for it to comply with the 
spirit of the Directive.  This type of freedom creates differences 
among the privacy policy regime that each State enacts.  For 
instance, France’s independent agency is chaired by members who 
hold additional positions in the federal government while the United 
Kingdom’s independent agency is chaired by members who do not 
hold additional positions within government.  
This paper seeks to explore the question of how much we 
should borrow from the EU model of data protection.  In order to 
determine whether the EU’s system is appropriate for the U.S. to 
imitate, it is helpful first to examine the Directive, and second to 
analyze its implementation by EU member states.  The two EU 
member states that will be examined are the U.K. and France.  These 
two countries were chosen as part of the analysis because of their 
unique and different approaches to the Directive’s implementation.  
Most importantly, both countries approach data protection using 
different levels of government interference and have defined 
government regulation in contrasting ways.  In order to truly 
understand the options available to the U.S. if it were to implement 
the EU approach, it is important to see how the EU states, 
themselves, have implemented the approach.   
The first section of this paper will examine the historical 
differences that have led to the American approach to privacy and the 
European approach to privacy.  The second section will examine the 
current U.S. model, and the third section will examine the EU model.  
Next, the fourth section will compare and contrast the two models.  
                                                          
Safe Harbor Agreement and the World Trade Organization, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2781, 2786 (2003) (arguing that the Safe Harbor Agreement has a very lax standard 
that does not ask much of U.S. companies). 
29 Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 20, at 145, 148. 
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Finally, the last section will argue that the U.S. should have a 
regulatory agency and describe how that should look and run. 
 
II.  EXISTING U.S. MODEL 
 
The current U.S. sectoral model of data protection was also 
greatly influenced by the Clinton administration.30  The rationale was 
that it would be better for businesses to regulate themselves than to 
have government intervene.31  Although businesses would be 
regulated by some laws, for the most part, businesses would decide 
how to implement data protection.  Indeed, state and federal 
regulatory laws are only one component of the U.S. informational 
privacy policy.  Even so, they are important nevertheless, because 
they define the scope and dictate the areas in which data privacy may 
be enforced.   
Currently, U.S. data privacy protection consists of a 
hodgepodge of laws that were originally drafted for the government 
and specific sectors of the economy.  Most of these laws were not 
created to apply to information gathered online, but over time they 
have been used to regulate data privacy.  Aside from legislation, 
recent developments in case law are also beginning to shape data 
protection.32  Unlike the EU model, where data privacy is a protected 
right, U.S. data privacy law is founded on tort and contract 
principles.33  Although these laws borrow from various legal areas 
                                                          
30 See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR 
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1–2 (1997), available at http://www.w3.org/ 
TR/NOTE-framework-970706. 
31 Id. 
32 See Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 
2007); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Bell v. Mich. Council, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 353 
(Mich. App. Feb. 15, 2005).  
33 See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Defining the Legal Standard for 
Information Security, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 19, 22 
(Anupham Chander, et al. eds., 2008) (noting that recent case law has upheld that 
breach of the common law duty to provide security amounts to a tort); Jonathan K. 
Sobel et al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern, and the 
Contract Law Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET 
AGE 55, 57–59 (Anupham Chander, et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that federal data 
protection laws are based on contract principles). 
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and apply to different sectors, it has been argued that these laws are 
“amazingly consistent in [their] approach . . . . ”34  In his article, 
Defining the Standard for Information Security, Thomas J. 
Smedinghoff argues that laws concerning information security have 
been consistent in defining the legal standard for data protection.35  
Smedinghoff argues that each law has approached data protection 
with the idea that “Security is a process, not a product.”36  Thus, 
these laws do not rigidly dictate the requirements for “reasonable 
security.”37  Rather, Smedinghoff identifies that data protection laws 
have set a “process oriented” legal standard, meaning that they 
“[focus] on a process to identify and implement measures that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to achieve the desired security 
objectives.”38  Indeed, when the federal laws are examined later in 
this article, we will see an unmistakable pattern of assessment of risk, 
identification of security measures, and verification of 
implementation that is required by the “process oriented” standard.39 
So, despite the fact that there are multiple areas and types of 
information being regulated on both state and federal levels, it seems 
that the laws do follow a consistent standard.  Currently, there are a 
slew of different federal laws.  Some apply only to the government’s 
collection and use of personal information, while others apply to 
specific sectors of industry and still others apply to protect certain 
portions of the population. 
 
A.  Data Privacy Laws at the Federal Level 
 
At the federal level, laws that protect citizens against the 
government’s use of personal information are the Privacy Act of 
197440 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).41  The Privacy 
Act of 1974 states that any federal agency collecting personal 
information for government records must: (1) collect only personal 
                                                          
34 See Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 23. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 23–24.  
38 Id. at 24. 
39 Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 24. 
40 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(5) (2006). 
41 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
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information that is “relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose 
of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive 
order of the President”; (2) maintain the accuracy of the information, 
and; (3) establish means of protecting the security of the 
information.42  
Similarly, FOIA makes the government responsible for 
guarding the personal information found in federal agency records.43  
Although FOIA is a law ensuring public access to governmental 
records, the Act protects privacy by exempting the public from 
obtaining personnel, medical, and law enforcement records.44  
Although these statutes were designed to apply primarily to federal 
records and government, they are not limited only to information 
gathered in the real world; thus, they may be applied to information 
gathered online as well.45 
Congress has regulated businesses’ data collection and use by 
enacting laws aimed at specific sectors of the market as well as 
specific sections of the population.46  These laws have been passed 
one at a time, and government regulation is beginning to expand to 
cover just about every possible sector.  Laws governing the business 
sectors are:  the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),47 the Cable 
Communications Policy Act (CCPA),48 the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),49 the Children’s 
Online Privacy Act,50 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),51 the 
                                                          
42 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1), (5), (10).  
43 See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. § 552(a)(3)(C) (“[A]n agency shall make reasonable efforts to 
search for the records in electronic form or format, except when such efforts would 
significantly interfere with the operation of the agency's automated information 
system."). 
46 See Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 59. 
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
48 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–554 (2006). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).  
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006).  
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act,52 and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
section 5 (FTC Act).53 
 
1.  Fair Credit Reporting Act 
 
Enacted in 1970,54 the FCRA was the first federal law 
intended to regulate private businesses’ use of personal information, 
especially where the consent of the individual has not been 
obtained.55  This Act is especially important to the U.S. system of 
data protection because it provides the basis for the country’s 
modern-day privacy legislation of “notice–and–consent” and “access 
to information.”56  The FCRA allows a credit agency to distribute a 
credit report containing personal information in order to determine 
the individual’s eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, and the 
like, but the act requires the credit agency to take reasonable 
measures to ensure the accuracy, relevancy, and proper use of the 
information.57  The FCRA regulates traditional as well as online 
credit reporting activities.58  Some have noted that the FCRA 
approaches data privacy using a “pseudo-contractual” approach to 
data protection by allowing customers to change the scope of their 
relationship with credit reporting agencies.59 
 
2.  Cable Communications Policy Act 
 
In 1984, Congress passed the CCPA,60 which requires cable 
companies to provide their customers with annual notice as to how 
their information is being used and the purpose for which it is being 
used.61  The CCPA also requires cable companies to give their 
                                                          
52 Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 304 (2002).  
53 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
54 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, (FCRA) and the Privacy of Your Credit 
Report, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/fcra/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).  
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.  See also Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 60. 
56 Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 60. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.   
59 Id. at 58.  
60 Cable Communications Policy of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–554 (2006). 
61 Id. 
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customers the option to remove their name from any mailing list 
before the list may be released to a third party.62 
 
3.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 
HIPAA was passed in 1996, and like the data protection laws 
before it, HIPAA requires medical providers, insurers, and other 
entities handling health information to adopt a system for notice, opt-
out-disclosures, and access to private information.63  The Act also 
requires secure transmission of health data.64 
 
4.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
 
The GLBA, also known as the Financial Modernization Act 
of 1999, adds onto the provisions of the FCRA.  The GLBA requires 
financial institutions to provide customers with notice of its 
information sharing practices along with an opportunity to opt out of 
certain disclosures of personal information to third parties.65  The 
GLBA also prohibits financial institutions from disclosing account 
numbers to unaffiliated third parties.66  Further, the Act not only puts 
responsibility on companies, but also on the FTC by requiring that 
the Commission formulate a Safeguards Rule that businesses must 
follow.67 
 
5.  Federal Trade Commission Act Section 
 
Lastly, section 5 of the FTC Act is also employed to ensure 
data privacy.  Although the Act, passed in 1938 and amended in 
1994, has long been present in consumer protection jurisprudence, it 
has only recently been applied to information security.68  Essentially, 
section 5 is a catch-all that regulates the business sectors that have 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 58. 
64 Id.    
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2012).  
68 Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 22.  Section 5 was first applied to 
information security in 2005.  Id.  
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not been covered by federal regulation.  The FTC has asserted that 
“failure to provide appropriate information security was itself, an 
unfair trade practice . . . . ”69 
Section 5 has been used to halt a number of practices 
dangerous to information privacy.  First, it can be used to protect 
consumer data.  In a complaint brought by the FTC against DSW, 
Inc., the FTC charged the company with engaging in an unfair 
practice when it allowed hackers to gain access to the credit card and 
checking account numbers of over 1.4 million customers.70  The FTC 
stated that DSW “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate 
security for sensitive customer information.”71  DSW had stored 
sensitive information in multiple files when it no longer needed such 
information, failed to use “readily available security measures,” and 
stored information in unencrypted files, among other things.72  
Second, the FTC has also applied section 5 to “phishing.”73  In 2004, 
the FTC brought a complaint against Zachary Hill for engaging in 
phishing activities.74  Hill had sent fraudulent emails to AOL users 
asking for users’ passwords and login names along with their bank 
account numbers and Social Security numbers.75  Third, the FTC has 
also applied section 5 to operations that secretly download spyware 
onto a user’s computer.  In a complaint brought against Seismic 
                                                          
69 Id.    
70 DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1, 
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.shtm. 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Phishing is a form of identity theft.  Con artists set up fake websites or 
send fraudulent emails that gather a user’s personal information, such as passwords 
and credit card information, once a user visits the website or opens the email.  See 
Phishing: Frequently Asked Questions, MICROSOFT SAFETY AND SECURITY 
CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/security/online-privacy/phishing-faq.aspx 
(click “What Is Phishing”) (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
74 See FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/03/ 
phishinghilljoint.shtm.  The Department of Justice eventually secured a 46-month 
prison sentence against Hill.  See FTC v. Hill, H 03-5537 (E.D. Va.), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323102/0323102zkhill.shtm (click on “Criminal 
Information”). 
75 FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, supra note 74. 
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Entertainment Productions, the FTC argued that Seismic engaged in 
unfair acts and practices when they downloaded software without 
notifying users.76  Seismic had downloaded spyware onto users’ 
computers which then compelled users to purchase “Spy Wiper” in 
order to have the spyware programs deleted.77  The FTC noted that it 
was an unfair act to “compel” users to purchase Spy Wiper by 
compromising their computers.78  But the FTC also found the act of 
installing the spyware, in the first place, as an unfair practice in and 
of itself because it was done without the user’s knowledge or 
permission.79 
 
6.  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
 
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 
enacted in 1998, is unlike most data protection laws in that it was 
aimed at protecting a specific section of the population rather than 
regulating a specific market.80  COPPA was aimed at regulating the 
collection of information of children under the age of thirteen.81  
Indeed, it requires web operators to comply with notice requirements 
and obtain parental permission before disclosing a child’s personal 
information.82  Again, we see contract principles coming into play—
here, minors are not able to contract and thus parents must make the 
decisions for them. 
 
                                                          
76 FTC Cracks Down on Spyware Operation, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/spyware.shtm.   
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 See COPPA, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, COPPA, 
http://www.coppa.org/comply.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
81 Id.  
82 COPPA poses a big problem to social networking websites such as 
Facebook.  See Emily Bazelon, Why Facebook Is After Your Kids, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/magazine/why-
facebook-is-after-your-kids.html?_r=0.  This also raises the question of 
enforcement of COPPA on such websites—who is to stop a 12 year old from 
creating an account on Facebook? 
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B.  State Laws 
 
In addition to federal laws, there are state laws that govern 
privacy protection.  Virtually all states have laws requiring a business 
to notify a consumer when its security has been breached.83  Other 
states have gone farther and have also enacted data destruction laws, 
or laws requiring the destruction of data once the business no longer 
wants to retain the information.84  In addition, some states also have 
laws imposing a duty on a business to provide security for personal 
information.85  State regulation in this area has been a relatively new 
occurrence.  When California passed its security breach notification 
law in 2003, it was the first state to do so and the legislation was 
considered a “landmark.”86  Since then, other states have followed 
and are moving towards the trend of broadening data protection.87  It 
                                                          
83 Smedinghoff, supra note 33.  See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 
(2007) (“ Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that 
owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, shall 
disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or 
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident . . . . ”).  Id. § 
1798.82(a).  
84 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2012).  States that have similar 
laws are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.  See also Smedinghoff, 
supra note 33, at 33. 
85 These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah.  Smedinghoff, 
supra note 33, at 32.  
86 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 17b: How to Deal With a 
Security Breach, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, (Feb. 2006), 
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs17b-SecurityBreach.htm.  See also Alexander P. 
Woollcott, California Significantly Expands Privacy Breach Notification Law, 
MMM TECH LAW & BUSINESS REPORT, http://www.mmmtechlaw.com/2011/09/22/ 
california-significantly-expands-privacy-breach-notification-law/ (last visited Dec. 
30, 2012).  
87 See Woollcott, supra note 86.  See also Massachusetts Privacy Law – 
201 CMR 17 Compliance, RAPID 7, 
http://www.rapid7.com/solutions/compliance/mass-201-CMR-17.jsp (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2012) (noting that Massachusetts’s new data privacy law has “set a new 
level in state security laws . . . . ”  The law was unlike the laws before it in that it 
applied to private and public sector entities “regardless of where that entity is 
located.”). 
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is interesting to note that some of the laws incorporate federal laws.  
For instance, California’s privacy breach notification law was 
expanded in 2011 to provide that entities that are subject to HIPAA 
will be considered as in compliance with the privacy breach 
notification law if those entities have complied with breach 
notifications under HIPAA.88  In addition, Massachusetts passed 201 
CMR 17 in 2008, a law that incorporated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act.89 
 
C.  Enforcement 
 
The FTC and the Department of Commerce are assigned the 
task of fulfilling the “regulating” part of the sectoral model.  In 
addition to its main task of investigating and reporting to Congress 
foreign trade conditions and domestic business conduct, the FTC 
regulates online privacy to the extent that it relates to business and 
trade.  Unfortunately, the FTC is limited in that it does not have the 
independent power to enforce data protection and there must exist a 
rule of law before it can do so.90  This means that the FTC cannot 
prevent data collection and distribution unless the collector has 
posted a privacy policy and then failed to act in accordance to that 
policy.91 
The Department of Commerce also plays a role in regulating 
data protection and has several agencies that help it do so: the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA), the International Trade Administration (ITA), the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Internet 
Policy Task Force.92  It is important to note, however, that these 
                                                          
88 See Woollcott, supra note 86. 
89 Massachusetts Privacy Law – 201 CMR 17 Compliance, RAPID 7, supra 
note 87; JILL JUDD, MA 201 CMR 17 STANDARDS 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.whipplehill.com/ftpimages/408/misc/misc_63679.pdf. 
90 FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF CONSUMER  PROT., PRIVACY ONLINE: 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE–A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS iii, 4, (May 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf. 
91 Id.  
92 Internet Policy Task Force, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policy-
task-force (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
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agencies do not exclusively regulate data protection, and are not set 
up exclusively for the purpose of regulating the Internet.  Presently, 
the NTIA serves as the President’s principal advisor on 
communications and data policy.93  The NTIA is responsible for 
working with other governments and international organizations to 
form compatible Internet policies, but it also works with businesses 
and other U.S. governmental agencies in order to develop new 
policies.94  
Unlike NTIA, the ITA’s scope is narrower and the portion of 
Internet policy that it focuses on is related to the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Agreement.95  The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement was 
formed in 2000 in order to facilitate the transfer of personal data 
between the U.S. and the EU.96  Before the Safe Harbor Agreement, 
the EU states could not transfer data to the U.S. because the U.S.’s 
data protection policy was inadequate according to the standards of 
the European Commission.97  The Safe Harbor Agreement created a 
set of guidelines for data protection that allowed for transmission of 
data between the U.S. and EU.98  The ITA is responsible for 
managing the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement and must make sure 
the U.S.’s data policy conforms to the agreement.99 
On the other hand, NIST is in charge of federal data 
protection on the Internet.100  NIST, along with the Department of 
Defense and the Intelligence Community, produces Joint Task Force 
                                                          
93 Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Secretary, NTIA, Speech at Hearing 
on Internet Privacy: The Views of the FTC, FCC, and NTIA (July 14, 2011), 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2011/testimony-assistant-
secretary-strickling-internet-privacy-views-ftc-fcc-and-nti [hereinafter Speech of 
Strickling]. 
94 Internet Policy, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policy (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2012). 
95 Id.  
96 U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2011). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Speech of Strickling, supra note 93. 
100 National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Proposes New 
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST TECH 
BEAT (July 19, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/privacy-071911.cfm. 
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Transformation Initiative Documents.101  NIST does not have a well-
defined area of expertise in terms of data protection, and it appears 
that it overlaps a great deal with other agencies.102  For instance, even 
though there is an Internet Policy Task Force, the NIST has its own 
Internet policy advisors.103  
Lastly, the Internet Policy Task Force (“Task Force”) is a 
newly formed agency whose purpose is to identify public policy and 
operational challenges in the Internet environment.104  In 2010, the 
Task Force released a paper proposing the creation of a data 
protection agency.105  In the paper, the Task Force argued that a data 
protection agency would be helpful because it would act as an 
“authority to convene businesses and civil society to develop 
effective, consensus-based voluntary codes of conduct in a wide 
variety of commercial contexts.”106  This proposed office will be part 
of the Department of Commerce.107  Although this proposal was met 
with enthusiasm by those lauding the EU model of regulation, it is 
clear that this proposed office is really nothing new.108  The agency 
will be like the Task Force itself, and it will work to facilitate 
communication between the private sector and the government in 
order to build upon the existing sectoral model.   
Although the sectoral model is meritorious because it affords 
businesses freer rein in conducting its affairs and does not require the 
government to “babysit,” so to speak, the sectoral model is far from 
perfect.  Among the criticisms of the sectoral model is the fact that it 
is unwieldy and usually results in ineffective and spotty 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 William Jackson, NIST To Get New Lead Internet Policy Advisor, GCN 
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://gcn.com/articles/2010/08/10/ari-schwartz-to-take-policy-
role-at-nist.aspx. 
103 Id.  
104 Internet Policy, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 94.  
105 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 19. 
106 Id. at 44.  
107 Id.  
108 Peter Swire, Getting Online Privacy Policy Right, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org// 
issues/2011/01/privacy_office.html.  
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enforcement.109  Precisely because a central authority is not involved 
in oversight of businesses, guidelines set out by the FTC are not 
followed across the board and, in addition, enforcement is difficult to 
carry out without a centralized body.110  As to the self-regulatory 
aspect of the sectoral model, it is clear that putting a business in 
charge of protecting the rights of its consumers leads to a conflict of 
interest.111 
 
III.  THE EU MODEL 
 
In contrast to the U.S. model, the EU online data privacy 
policy gives less freedom to businesses in conducting its business in 
the online privacy front.  In 1995, the European Union passed its 
Directive on Data Protection,112 which among other things, provided 
standards that member nations were required to follow.  For instance, 
member states were required to ensure that personal information is to 
be “processed fairly and lawfully”113 and “kept in a form which 
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary.”114   
The Data Directive is incredibly protective of personal 
information and regulates how the information is used, when it is 
used, and how the notification of data collection should be given.115  
Many have argued that the EU’s emphasis on informational privacy 
stems from World War II and Germany’s horrific past.  The 
extensive government records that allowed Germany to single out its 
                                                          
109 Ryan Moshell, . . . And Then There was One: The Outlook For a Self-
Regulatory United States Amidst A Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data 
Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 367 (2005).   
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
113 Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
114 Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
115 EU countries have a well-defined basis for online privacy rights. On 
the other hand, U.S. law does not directly or specifically protect individual privacy.  
The Constitution does not protect individual privacy rights.  See Susan E. Gindin, 
Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of Internet, 34 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1185 (1997) (detailing the Constitution’s lack of privacy 
protection for personal information and tracing Supreme Court decisions that have 
upheld that the Constitution does not recognize privacy for personal information).  
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Jewish citizens have led to a European concern for data privacy.116  
Whatever the reason for Europe’s strong focus on privacy, it is clear 
that the EU has a stronger policy than that of the U.S. and at the 
foundation of this policy is the Data Directive.  
The EU model of data protection is described as a 
comprehensive model in which an entity is set up to ensure that 
businesses and individuals are adhering to privacy protection laws.117  
The Data Directive provides the broad framework of rules that 
member states must then implement and add to in any way they 
please.  The Data Directive provides eight main principles: (1) 
purpose limitation, (2) data quality, (3) data security, (4) special 
protection for sensitive data, (5) transparency, (6) data transfers, (7) 
independent oversight, and (8) individual redress.118  The principle of 
purpose limitation requires that the information should only be 
collected to the extent that it is necessary for a specific purpose and 
that it is not stored any longer than is needed.119  Data quality 
requires that information be updated.120  Data security requires that 
reasonable measures be taken to provide secure data transmissions.121  
Next, the special protection for sensitive data principle forbids 
government from collecting information regarding the “racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs . . . 
[or] concerning health or sex life.”122  The transparency principle 
stands for the idea that the person on whom information is collected 
should be notified of the fact.123  The Data Directive requires not 
only that individuals be informed when information is collected 
about them but also that the person be informed of the identity of the 
collector and the purpose for which it will be used.124  Next, under 
the data transfers principle, transfers of personal information to third 
                                                          
116 See Moshell, supra note 109, at 358.  Indeed, a look at the Data 
Directive’s prohibition on government’s collection of information regarding an 
individual’s racial or ethnic background certainly seems to back this point.  
117 Id. at 366. 
118 Cates, supra note 21, at 173, 185–86.  
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.   
122 Data Directive, supra note 22, art. 8(1).  
123 See Cates, supra note 21, at 186.  
124 Id.   
    
Fall 2012 U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies  831 
parties are prohibited if done without consent of the data subject.125  
Also, under the independent oversight principle, an oversight body 
that will audit data processing systems and investigate complaints 
must be set up.126  Lastly, the individual redress principle requires 
that individuals be provided with the right to access their personal 
information and enforce legal rights against those who wrongfully 
use their personal information.127  In addition to these eight 
principles, the Directive also requires that EU members only 
exchange data with non-EU countries only if the non-EU country has 
an “adequate” data protection policy.128   
In order to enforce the principles of the Directive, in 2000 the 
EU created a supervisory authority to oversee the EU community in 
regards to data policy protection.129  This supervisory authority is 
called the European Data-Protection Supervisor and works 
independently from the European Parliament and Commission, 
meaning that it does not take orders from either.130  The Supervisor’s 
more specific duties include investigation of complaints and 
providing information to the EU community in general.131  The 
Supervisor may exert power in the instance where “data processing is 
carried out in the EU and the data controller is established there.”132  
The Supervisor may also exert power when the data controller is not 
based in the EU but in a place “where its national law applies by 
                                                          
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 Id.  
128 See Data Directive, supra note 22, art. 3.  This rule has been quite 
problematic for those countries wishing to obtain EU membership as well as those 
countries wishing to trade with EU nations.  See also Eric Shapiro, All is Not Fair 
in the Privacy Trade: The Safe Harbor Agreement and the World Trade 
Organization, 71 FORDHAM L. REV 2781 (2003) (explaining how prospective EU 
members must conform to the EU’s data policy in order to become a member).  
129 Authority for the EU Data Protection Supervisor was created in 
Regulation 45/2001.  Council Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, ch.1, art. 1(2), 2000 O.J. (L 8).  
130 Id. at art. 44(1), (2). 
131 Id. at art. 46.  
132 Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection 
Law and Electronic Commerce, 35 INT’L LAW. 79, 82 (2001).  
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virtue of public international law.” 133  Lastly, the Supervisor may 
also exert power when the “data controller is established outside the 
EU but equipment is used in the EU for the purposes of processing 
data.”134 
Now that we’ve examined the legal basis for the EU privacy 
regime, it is also necessary to analyze the implementation of the 
Directive.  EU member states are given the freedom to implement the 
Directive in the way that each chooses, and each state has a unique 
way of carrying out the EU law.  It is especially interesting to see the 
varying levels of power that each state has given its government in 
order to regulate data privacy.  The policy question of how much 
power should be given to government to protect privacy shows how 
each country has managed to balance the competing interests of 
fundamental rights and state power.  In addition, this topic is also 
important because the question lies at the very core of the U.S. data 
protection model.  The different approaches that EU states have 
chosen will help determine whether a policy similar to the EU policy 
will be feasible in the U.S.   
Two EU countries that best illustrate diverging approaches in 
the level of power it accords to government in regulating privacy are 
the U.K. and France.  The U.K. has generally been careful about 
burdening companies and stepping too much on the toes of 
businesses in the process of protecting privacy.  In addition, it has not 
enacted any overreaching laws that have interfered with existing 
rights.  On the other hand, France has come under fire more than 
once for what some perceive as over-inclusive laws that infringe 
upon the liberties of its people. 
 
A.  The United Kingdom 
 
In the U.K., the government body overseeing online privacy 
enforcement is called the Informational Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO).  The ICO was formed with the goals of transparency of 
businesses and information collectors and privacy of personal 
information.  The ICO is a relatively young organization that has 
                                                          
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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developed a great deal since its humble start.135  In its early days, the 
ICO consisted of only 80 people working in a single office.136  
Today, it has 4 offices with a total staff count of 353 and receives a 
little over 30,500 complaints a year.137  Its goals are to promote 
transparency and data privacy for personal information.138 
The ICO was created in 1984 and was originally titled the 
Data Protection Registrar until 2000 when it was given its current 
name.139  It is tasked with enforcing the Data Protection Act of 1998, 
the Data Protection Telecommunications Directive (97/66/EC), the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, and the 
Environmental Communications Regulations 2003, and the Freedom 
of Information Act.140  In addition, this body is also responsible for 
ensuring that the U.K. complies with EU rules.141  Further, the ICO 
has a public record of all data controllers and requires all data 
controllers to register.142  Although it is a government body, the ICO 
is given much relative freedom in that it is an independent regulatory 
agency that reports to Parliament.143  
In order to enforce the data privacy policies for which it is 
responsible, the ICO has a number of means available to it.  However 
the options it can exercise depend on whether the issue at hand 
concerns data privacy or transparency.  In order to promote data 
privacy, the ICO has eight options on which it may proceed: (1) serve 
                                                          
135 A large part of this growth should be credited to the Internet boom.  
136 Information Commissioner’s Office, History of the ICO, ICO, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/history.aspx (last visited Dec. 
30, 2012).  It is interesting to note that in its second year, the ICO only received 
eleven complaints throughout that year.  Id.  However, it is important to keep in 
mind that this was before the Internet became widely accessible.  
137 Information Commissioner’s Office, Key Facts, ICO, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/key_facts.aspx (last visited Dec. 
30, 2012). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Information Commissioner’s Office, Introduction to the ICO, ICO, 
available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation /introduction.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Information Commissioner’s Office, History of the ICO, supra note 
136. 
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notices, (2) issue undertakings, (3) serve enforcement notices, (4) 
conduct assessments, (5) serve assessment notices, (6) issue fine 
notices, (7) prosecute wrongdoer, and (8) report to Parliament on 
pervasive issues.144  When the ICO chooses to serve notices, it will 
give notice that an organization must turn over particular information 
to the ICO within a specified period of time.145  When the ICO issues 
undertakings, on the other hand, it will require that an organization 
take a specific course of action in order to adhere faithfully to the 
rules.146  Next, enforcement notices are commonly used when there 
has been noncompliance and these notices require that an 
organization take steps in order to comply with the law.147  Then, 
there are assessments or audits in order to ensure compliance.148  The 
serving of assessment notices is used to assess whether an 
organization is collecting personal data accordingly; this option is 
used for data protection only.149  Next, fines of up to £500,000 may 
be issued for “serious” breaches of the Data Protection Act or the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations.150  Then, of 
course, there is always the option to prosecute those who engage in 
                                                          
144 Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection 
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, ICO, http://www.ico.gov.uk/ 
what_we_cover/taking_action/dp_pecr.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).  
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 See Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data 
Protection and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144. 
150 Id.  The ICO wasn’t given the power to fine organizations until 2008.  
See Stuart Sumner, Analysis: Should the ICO Wield the Carrot or the Stick?, 
COMPUTING.CO.UK (Aug. 4, 2001), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/analysis/ 
2099482/analysis-ico-wield-carrot-stick.  Interestingly, Commissioner Graham has 
asked for the power to issue custodial sentencing for breaches under the Data 
Protection Act.  Id.  
The ICO’s largest fine to date (£130,000) has been issued to Powys 
County Council for sending information about a child protection case to the wrong 
recipients.  See Dan Raywood, Largest ICO Fine Issued To Powys County Council 
for Two Breaches of Sensitive Data, SC MAGAZINE UK (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/largest-ico-fine-issued-to-powys-county-council-
for-two-breaches-of-sensitive-data/article/218221/. 
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criminal acts under the Data Protection Act.151  Prosecutions usually 
involve fines and a conditional discharge,152 which means that the 
wrongdoer will not receive a punishment if they comply with certain 
rules for a period of time.  Lastly, the ICO may report to Parliament 
in order to address data privacy issues.153 
The methods that the ICO may use to promote transparency 
are not unlike those available to counter act data privacy issues, but 
there are some still minor differences.  Just as with data privacy 
issues, the ICO may still tackle transparency issues by conducting 
assessments, serving information notices, issuing undertakings, 
prosecuting wrongdoers, and reporting to Parliament.154  However, 
unlike with a data privacy issues, the ICO may issue practice 
recommendations and decision notices.155  Practice recommendations 
are used to map out steps a public organization should take to uphold 
the codes.  In the same vein, decision notices report the results of the 
ICO’s investigation to “publically highlight particular issues with an 
authority’s handling of a specific request.”156  
                                                          
151 Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection 
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144. 
152 Id.  In addition to fines and conditional discharge, the ICO is also 
calling for “more effective deterrent sentences, including the threat of prison, to be 
available to the courts to stop the unlawful use of personal information.”  See 
Information Commissioner’s Office, Receptionist Unlawfully Accessed Sister-in-
Law’s Medical Details, ICO (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/ 
latest_news/2011/receptionist-unlawfully-accessed-sister-in-law-medical-details-
16122011.aspx. 
153 Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection 
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144. 
154 See id.; Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Freedom 
of Information, Environmental Information and Spatial or Geographic 
Information, http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/foi_eir.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
155 Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Freedom of 
Information, Environmental Information and Spatial or Geographic Information, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/foi_eir.aspx (last visited Oct. 
25, 2012).  In addition, the ICO may not issue assessment notices, which can only 
be used for privacy issues.  But it seems that this would not make much of a 
difference because an enforcement notice essentially serves the same purpose as an 
assessment notice.  Id. 
156 Id. 
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Despite the various means through which for the ICO can 
enforce the Data Protection Act, some still perceive it as toothless 
and inept.157  This perception of ineptness has recently been furthered 
by the Leveson Inquiry.158  During the Leveson Inquiry, Francis 
Aldhouse, a former head of the ICO, stated that media groups were 
“too big” for the ICO to confront despite the fact that the public body 
had clear evidence showing that journalists were engaging in phone 
hacking to obtain stories.159  Although it is conceded that the ICO 
was not the only group afraid to step up to the powerful media 
conglomerates, the Leveson Inquiry was a blow to the ICO’s 
reputation nonetheless.160  Testimony about the ICO during the 
Leveson Inquiry and its subsequent criticism offers a telling portrait 
of how citizens feel about the organization.  The Leveson Inquiry 
tackles a universally condemned breach of privacy, and it is 
                                                          
157 See The Frontline, ICO’S Reputation Takes a Hit After Leveson 
Testimony by Former Deputy, V3.CO.UK (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-
uk/the-frontline-blog/2129362/icos-reputation-takes-hit-leveson-testimony-deputy 
(“The [ICO] has never had an easy existence, many criticising it as a toothless 
watchdog before it had the power to fine organisations, and then complaining that it 
has failed to use this power correctly since it was introduced.”). 
158  The Leveson Inquiry is an investigation into journalism practices 
sparked by the News of the World phone hacking debacle.  See Background, The 
Leveson Inquiry, THE LEVESON INQUIRY, available at 
http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).   
159 Leveson Inquiry: Watchdog Chief Francis Aldhouse ‘refused to go 
after papers’ Despite Steve Whittamore Hacking Evidence, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 
1, 2011, 7:21 AM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-
inquiry/8927424/Leveson-Inquiry-watchdog-chief-Francis-Aldhouse-refused-to-
go-after-papers-despite-Steve-Whittamore-hacking-evidence.html. 
160 See The Frontline, ICO’S Reputation Takes a Hit After Leveson 
Testimony by Former Deputy, supra note 157 (“However, while it's easy to find 
fault with the ICO, the organisation was clearly one of countless groups, businesses 
and individuals that dared not incur the wrath of the Murdoch media empire, even 
if they were operating on behalf of the government.”).   
Testimony during the Leveson Inquiry revealed that many others knew 
about journalists hacking into phones.  See Nick Davies, Murdoch Papers Paid 
£1m to Gag Phone-Hacking Victims, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2009, 5:33 PM), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/jul/08/murdoch-papers-phone-
hacking.  Despite this fact, however, the ICO’s inaction in the face of glaring 
evidence appears especially egregious because the ICO is supposed to be an 
independent watchdog for UK citizens and, unlike other groups, had less of an 
interest at stake in confronting this unethical journalistic practice.   
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understandable that many would be angry at the ICO’s inaction 
because of the emotionally polarizing subject matter.  However, the 
overall sense of dissatisfaction towards the ICO reflects the 
consensus of many citizens that the group is incompetent.161  The 
ICO’s own monitoring reports evidence slow progress in bringing 
organizations and businesses up to speed with the Data Protection 
Act.162  Even though a survey in late 2011 showed an improvement 
from past years, citizens are still dissatisfied with the ICO.163  The 
recent survey showed that nearly three-quarters of firms were aware 
that they needed to protect personal information, which was a 26% 
improvement from the previous year’s survey.164  However, it is 
unclear whether firms are actually complying with the Data 
Protection Act.165  In addition, three-fourths of citizens surveyed felt 
that online businesses were not adequately protecting their data.166   
What’s more, many U.K. citizens are unaware of the 
existence of the ICO.167  According to a survey of 2,000 people 
conducted by OnePoll for the security company, LogRhythm, sixty-
four percent of those polled did not know about the ICO, and of those 
that were aware of the ICO, only thirty-three percent believed that the 
                                                          
161 See Stuart Sumner, Analysis: Should the ICO Wield the Carrot or the 
Stick?, COMPUTING.CO.UK  (Aug. 4, 2001),  http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/ 
analysis/2099482/analysis-ico-wield-carrot-stick. 
162 See Information Commissioner’s Office, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT PUBLICATION SCHEMES POLICE SECTOR MONITORING REPORT (March 2010), 
available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/~/ 
media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/Research_and_reports/POLICE
_SECTOR_PS_MONITORING_REPORT.ashx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012); See 
also Simon Quicke, ICO Reveals Patchy Progress From Firms Over Data 
Protection, MICROSCOPE.CO.UK (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.microscope.co.uk/news/reseller-news/ico-reveals-patchy-progress-
from-firms-over-data-protection/.  
163 See Quicke, supra note 162. 
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id.  This distrust is, in large part, a reaction to various news reports of 
businesses losing client information and police using information to snoop into 
citizens’ personal lives.  Id.  
167 LogRhythm, Research Shows UK Public Losing Patience with 
Organisations that Endanger Customer Data, LOGRHYTHM.COM (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://logrhythm.com/company/press-releases/research-shows-uk-public-losing-
patience.aspx. 
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group was adequately fulfilling its duties.168  Perhaps the 
dissatisfaction stems from how the ICO enforces the law.  The ICO 
has only recently been given the power to fine organizations and this 
power has worked to put some teeth into the once toothless data 
privacy group.169  But now that the ICO has a stick with which to 
enforce the law, the question becomes whether or not the ICO should 
work directly with companies and organizations in order to guide 
them towards a data protection plan or whether fines should be 
issued.170  For some organizations that already have their budgets 
spread thin a fine would be devastating.171  However, the other side 
of the coin reveals that such organizations will be unlikely to risk 
another fine or a fine at all, and the threat of a fine would encourage 
businesses and organizations to be more careful about complying 
with the rules.172  Lastly, the ICO is criticized for primarily targeting 
breaches made by the public sector.173 
 
B.  France 
 
In France, the data protection authority is known as the 
Commission on Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL).174  
The word “information” in CNIL is incredibly broad and is defined 
to cover the “organization, processing, and transmission of personal 
information, normally by computers, but it also includes a concern 
for the implications of information systems for society.”175  CNIL 
was created by the January 6, 1978 Act and was intended to protect 
                                                          
168 Id.  LogRhythm is a company that provides products used for cyber 
security.  See About LogRhythm, LOGRHYTHM.COM, 
http://www.logrhythm.com/Company/Overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).  
169 See Sumner, supra note 161.  
170 Id.  Some believe that “[t]raining and education is the best way to 
prevent data breaches . . . .”  Id. 
171 See id.  
172 See id. 
173 Peter Judge, ICO Slaps Oldham School, But Suffers Fresh Criticism, 
TECHWEEK EUROPE (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/ico-
slaps-oldham-school-but-suffers-fresh-criticism-27241.  
174 See Its Status, CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/status/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
175 DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETIES 176 (1989).  
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the privacy and individual rights of French citizens in the face of 
technological changes.176  Like the U.K.’s ICO, CNIL is an 
independent agency.177  Unlike the ICO, however, CNIL is more 
seamlessly integrated into its country’s government.178  While the 
ICO consists of members independent of Parliament, CNIL consists 
of several members who hold actual positions within the branches of 
government.179  For instance, among the members of CNIL are four 
members of Parliament, two members of the Economic and Social 
Council, and six Supreme Court judges.180  The five other members 
of CNIL do not hold seats in government.181  Most recently, the 
French Data Protection Act was amended by a new law.182  The new 
law provides for a new position within CNIL’s plenary committee 
known as Defender of Rights.183 
Four departments assist CNIL commissioners with their tasks: 
(1) Legal & International Affairs and Expert Appraisals; (2) Users 
Relations and Inspections; (3) Design, Innovation, & Expertise; and 
(4) Human Resources, Finance, IT, & Logistics.184  CNIL’s tasks 
consist of reviewing bills submitted to it by the government, issuing 
sanctions or warnings to noncompliant companies, conducting 
                                                          
176 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Its Status, 
CNIL.FR, available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/status/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2012).  The catalyst to the creation of CNIL was the government’s SAFARI project 
which involved assigning numbers to each citizen in order to streamline records.  
Id.  The public heavily criticized SAFARI, and feared total invasion of personal 
privacy.  Id.  So CNIL was formed to counteract these fears.  Id.  
177 Id.  
178 This arm’s length relationship with the government further complicates 
CNIL’s independence, or lack thereof.  FLAHERTY, supra note 175, at 185. 
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 See Hunton & Williams, LLP, French Data Protection Act Amended, 
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2011/03/articles/french-data-protection-act-
amended/. 
183 Id. 
184 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Its Operation, 
CNIL.FR, available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/its-operation/ (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2012). 
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investigations, and informing the public of its rights and 
obligations.185   
CNIL has the power to regulate, inspect, sanction, and keep 
inventory of existing processing operations.186  Under CNIL’s 
regulatory power, companies or entities wishing to implement a 
public file must first receive an affirmative ruling from the body.187  
Under its investigatory power, CNIL has the right to investigate 
complaints and to monitor the security of data processing.188  In 
addition, according to the August 6, 2004 Act, CNIL may either 
impose sanctions of up to €300,000 or it may issue warnings, 
depending on the type of breach.189 
CNIL has been criticized for its lack of independence from 
the government.  Critics have claimed that CNIL has leaned towards 
supporting the government rather than remaining faithful to its 
original purpose of protecting data privacy and citizens’ rights.190  As 
mentioned earlier, CNIL was created in response to criticism of the 
government program SAFARI, which was a project creating a 
database documenting each citizen.191  It appears that CNIL was 
originally created to protect French citizens from government 
intrusions to privacy.  In this respect, citizens regard CNIL as 
abandoning its duties.192     
Recently, the French government passed a law named 
LOPPSI 2 that allows blocking Internet access without a court order 
to sites containing child pornography.193  Although those opposed to 
                                                          
185 Id.  
186 Missions and Powers, CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-
cnil/operation/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
187 Id.  
188 Id. 
189 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, supra note 
184. 
190 Chloe Leprince, Cnil: trente ans contre la << tyrannie de l’ordinateur 
>> [CNIL: Thirty Years Against the “‘Tyranny of the Computer’”], RUE 89 (Jan. 
6, 2008), http://www.rue89.com/2008/01/06/cnil-trente-ans-contre-la-tyrannie-de-
lordinateur.  
191 See supra note 176. 
192 See supra notes 161–166 and accompanying text. 
193 France: Loppsi 2 Adopted-Internet Filtering Without Court Order, 
EDRI (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.4/web-blocking-
adopted-france-loppsi-2.  
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the law challenged it in the Constitutional Council, the law was 
declared to be valid under the French Constitution.194  This law was 
heavily criticized by French citizens who saw it as censorship of the 
Internet.195  Although the CNIL voiced its reservations in preliminary 
drafts of LOPPSI 2, French citizens felt that this was not enough.196  
Indeed, it was even more shocking to French citizens that the 
president of CNIL, Alex Tüurk, ended up voting for LOPPSI 2.197  
Despite these critiques, CNIL does appear to be dogged in its 
protection of privacy.  In 2011 it fined Google €100,000 for 
collecting passwords, email messages, and login names while taking 
pictures for Street View.198   
 
IV.  COMPARISON OF THE EU AND U.S. MODELS 
 
In comparing the U.S. and EU models, one can see many 
differences and some similarities at both the legislative and 
enforcement levels.  At the legislative level, the EU regime appears 
more streamlined and less complex than its U.S. counterpart.  For 
example, the EU relies on only one law to provide the right to 
informational privacy for citizens of EU states.  In contrast, instead 
of relying on one law to grant privacy protection, the U.S. relies on a 
multitude of laws, such as the GLBA and HIPAA, to secure privacy.  
Because the U.S. model relies on narrowly tailored laws to carve out 
privacy rights, data protection in the U.S. depends upon various 
factors, such as the type of information in question and the type of 
business in question.  Thus, U.S. citizens are is not given the right to 
privacy of any and all personal information; rather, the right to 
                                                          
194 Loppsi 2 Bill Passes the French Constitutional Council Test, EDRI 
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.6/loppsi-2-adopted. 
195 See Leprince, supra note 190. 
196 Christophe Auffray, Loppsi 2: la CNIL émet toujours des réserves 
[Loppsi 2: the CNIL Still has its Reservations], ZDNET.FR (June. 23, 2011), 
http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/loppsi-2-la-cnil-emet-toujours-des-reserves-
39752653.htm.  
197 Juliean L., Le président de la CNIL justifie son vote des Loppsi et 
Hadopi [The President of the CNIL Justifies His Vote and Loppsi and Hadopi] , 
NUMERAMA (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.numerama.com/magazine/17999-le-
president-de-la-cnil-justifie-son-vote-des-loppsi-et-hadopi.html.  
198 France Fines Google Over Street View Data Blunder, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12809076.  
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privacy depends on the type of information and whether or not the 
sector of industry controlling the data is subject to regulation.  On the 
other hand, EU informational privacy is not bound by such factors 
because the Directive grants a broad right to privacy across the board, 
regardless of the type of business or information involved.   
Interestingly enough, however, when the eight principles of 
the Directive are compared to the multiple U.S. laws, we can see that 
a number of U.S. laws strive to accomplish the same goals as the 
Directive.  It must be noted, however, that because of the way it is set 
up, the goals of the U.S. system really depends on the laws in place 
and each law varies one from the next.  Recall that the eight goals of 
the EU law are: (1) purpose limitation, (2) data quality, (3) data 
security, (4) special protection, (5) transparency, (6) data transfers, 
(7) independent oversight, and (8) individual redress.199  The 
Directive goals that many U.S. laws target are: data quality, data 
security, transparency, data transfers, and individual redress.  The 
fact that the U.S. framework allows users to update or correct 
information to achieve the end-goal of data quality is not surprising 
because it is in the best interests of businesses to do so—just look at 
your Google or Amazon account, it will most likely allow you to 
change or add to your address and credit card information.  However, 
there are laws that also strive to protect the best interests of citizens, 
including HIPAA and FCRA.   
Next, the U.S. model also shares the goal of data security in 
that it requires businesses to take reasonable measures to provide data 
security.  In addition, the U.S. model also encourages transparency 
by requiring companies to give notice.  The most notable laws 
providing for notice are GLBA, HIPAA, FCRA, COPPA, and, on the 
state level, California’s security reporting statute, California Civil 
Code § 1798.82.  Unlike the business-driven aim of data quality, the 
goal of transparency seems to be driven by legislatures more than 
industry practice.   
Next, the U.S. model also shares with the Directive the goal 
of protecting data transfers.  This goal, however, is closely 
intertwined with the aim for transparency, and the U.S. uses the same 
transparency mechanisms of notice and opt-out to protect data 
transfers.  Lastly, the U.S. also provides its citizens with the option 
                                                          
199 See supra discussion at 830–31. 
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for individual redress.  An individual may sue businesses under some 
federal statutes and state laws if her personal information is 
mishandled.  In the end, the EU Directive and U.S. models do share a 
great deal of similarities on the theoretical level.   
In application, however, the differences that do exist between 
the two models inevitably lead to differences on the enforcement 
level also.  The EU model’s reliance on solely the Directive to grant 
privacy protection and the broad rights that the Directive provides, 
results in a fairly straightforward and predictable application.  In 
contrast, the fact that the U.S. model rests on various laws, which are 
further derived from different sources—contracts, tort, state, and 
federal—adds to the complexity of its policy.  This complexity in the 
U.S. policy yields unpredictability and confusion for both industry 
and citizens.  For instance, different laws create different legal 
standards.  Under contract principles, a company may be required to 
provide notice, choice, and access to any transfer of personal 
information.  Under tort law, if negligence is invoked, a company 
would need to be held to the same duty of care as that practiced by 
others in the same industry.  In addition, there may be standards 
imposed by federal and state law.  The various possible standards 
make it difficult for a company to determine its level of 
responsibility.  In the same vein, it also creates unpredictability for a 
potential plaintiff seeking redress.  Some have noted that class action 
suits relying on contract claims have been more successful than those 
relying on federal statutes, which are usually inapplicable.200        
Comparison of the EU and U.S. models reveals some 
similarities but also vast differences.  One difference that makes the 
U.S. model weaker in comparison to the EU model is the patchwork 
of laws the former employs.  These laws create a complex and often 
confusing system that frustrates both businesses and private citizens 
alike.  On the other hand, the EU model has only one source that 
provides the right to data protection, which makes for a more 
straightforward, simple system.  Despite these differences, however, 
the U.S. and the EU do share similar policy goals.  So, it is not the 
U.S. laws themselves that need reworking because it is the 
                                                          
200 See Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 61 (noting that federal statutes 
sometimes did not provide for the more common types of data misuse). 
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application of the laws that create the differences between the EU 
and U.S. models. 
 
V.  AN EXACT DUPLICATION OF THE EU MODEL WILL NOT WORK IN 
THE U.S. 
 
There is undoubtedly a need for a stronger data protection 
regime in the U.S., but an exact duplication of the EU model is not 
the answer.  If the U.S. were to adopt the EU model, it would first 
have to pass something identical to the Directive because the 
Directive is the legal foundation for the EU’s data protection policy 
and the very heart of the EU model.  As mentioned before, the 
Directive essentially guarantees citizens a right to informational 
privacy.  One glaring problem that the U.S. would have if it were to 
pass a Directive-like law would be the validity of the law.  Even 
though the right to privacy has been recognized in the U.S., case law 
shows that this right is not limitless and is subject to a number of 
qualifications.   
 Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right 
to privacy, the Supreme Court has read this right into the document.  
The most notable Supreme Court cases establishing this right are 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.  In Griswold, the Court 
had to decide on the constitutionality of several Connecticut statutes 
that forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples.201  
Expanding upon its previous rulings upholding personal autonomy, 
the Court held that the Constitution also guaranteed generally, the 
right to keep private matters from disclosure and, specifically, the 
right of marital privacy.202  Despite the fact that the Constitution 
                                                          
201 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
202 Id. at 486.  The Court had previously upheld personal autonomy in a 
variety of cases.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking 
down a statute that allowed for sterilization of criminals, stating that procreation is 
“one of the basic civil rights of man”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925) (Court struck down an Oregon statute requiring children to attend 
public schools, stating “the [statute] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923) (Court struck down a Nebraska 
law prohibiting foreign languages from being taught to schoolchildren under the 
reasoning that parents had a right to determine what their children should learn, and 
teachers had a right to teach the subjects of their choosing.).  
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itself does not mention privacy, it was a legitimate right nonetheless 
because “[v]arious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of 
privacy.”203  Griswold is important not only because it cemented the 
right of privacy, but also because it defined privacy.  Here, privacy 
was defined as the right of protecting private matters from disclosure 
and intrusion by the State.204     
Eight years after Griswold, the Court decided the case of Roe 
v. Wade and expanded its definition of privacy to include personal 
autonomy.205  This controversial case dealt with a set of Texas 
statutes that criminalized abortion.206  Citing to a string of cases that 
had upheld the right to privacy, the Court concluded that such a right 
included a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.207  
However, the Court noted that this privacy right of personal 
autonomy “cannot be said to be absolute” and that there are situations 
in which a state may properly intervene in areas protected by the 
right.208 
From Griswold and Roe v. Wade, we get two definitions of 
privacy—personal autonomy and freedom from intrusion and 
disclosure.  It is interesting to note that these seminal privacy cases 
involved governmental and not a private third-party intrusion on 
privacy. So whether or not privacy rights can be enforced against 
private third parties is a question that the Court has left unanswered.  
In addition, informational privacy is not like any other privacy right 
that the Court has come across, and it is unclear whether the Court 
would be willing to expand its definition of “privacy” to include 
informational privacy.  In Whalen v. Roe, for instance, the Court 
allowed the state of New York to maintain a database containing 
names of those who have acquired prescription drugs known to be 
sold on the illegal market.209  The Court stated that it was possible 
that the Constitution provided for informational privacy, but it 
                                                          
203 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.  
204 JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 632 (13th ed., 
2009).  
205 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
206 Id. at 117–18.  
207 Id. at 152–53. 
208 Id. at 154. 
209 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).  
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declined to decide on the matter.210  As such, the Court appears wary 
of addressing this issue, and when the opportunity to decide on the 
matter came up once more in the case of NASA v. Nelson, the Court 
dodged the issue.211   
Even assuming that the Court will incorporate informational 
privacy into the current privacy right, the constitutional issue will 
still be further complicated because the protections to privacy that 
citizens have against the government are weak.  If the privacy 
protection is not ironclad even as against the government, and this 
right is constitutionally protected, we can assume that the protection 
of privacy that citizens have against private parties (something that 
is not constitutionally protected) will be even weaker.  Indeed, the 
U.S. legal framework carefully protects the free flow of information, 
and a wholesale adoption of the restrictive EU model would act as a 
major roadblock to this important tenet of American jurisprudence.  
As discussed previously, the EU model affects the collection, use, 
and distribution of personal data.212  At the very core of the 
American system of democracy is freedom of information.  It is 
something that we take pride in because we feel that it sets us apart 
from countries that oppress and censor their citizens.  The EU model 
gives citizens a lot of control over their personal information.  Thus, 
if the U.S. adopts this model, it would conflict with decades of case 
law allowing for dissemination of information and free flow of 
information.213          
Moreover, an exact replica of the EU model for the U.S. will 
not work because the U.S. already has a model in place, and that 
model is completely opposite to that of the EU model.214  It would 
follow then, that if the U.S. adopted the EU model, the adoption 
                                                          
210 Id.  
211 NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (2011), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf.  
212 Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 20, at 148. 
213 See TIME, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding that the Times 
standard privilege precluded recovery under a New York statute that allowed for 
recovery when a publication contained factual inaccuracies in matters of public 
interest); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Haynes v. Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229, 1234–35 (7th Cir. 1993) (Seventh Circuit ruled that 
a book depicting details of the Haynes’s relationship, including the husband’s 
alcoholism, did not invade their privacy). 
214 See discussion, supra 815. 
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would have the effect of razing the current system in favor of a 
completely different system.  Practically speaking, it would be 
impossible to uproot the system and start anew from the ground up. 
 
VI.  TAKING THE MIDDLE ROAD 
 
Even though a wholesale adoption of the EU model would not 
work in the U.S., that doesn’t mean that the U.S. shouldn’t borrow 
from the EU model.  The U.S. doesn’t have to pass sweeping laws or 
take extreme measures in order to improve its data protection model; 
rather, it can implement smaller measures.  The goal should be to 
find a plan that works within the U.S. form of government—one that 
is compatible with its existing laws, political history, and culture.  To 
this end, the U.S. would benefit from borrowing some ideas from the 
EU model, but should still keep the main framework on which the 
existing model is built.   
At present, the U.S. has a data privacy model that works 
within its constitutional structure.  This model combines a variety of 
federal and state laws based on tort and contract principles with a 
process-oriented approach.215  Because these laws aren’t grounded in 
constitutional rights, they provide a legitimate basis for data 
protection.  In other words, these laws will not fall if they are 
attacked on constitutional grounds.  However, this is not to say that 
the data policy is perfect.  Although it is true that grounding the data 
protection laws on torts and contract principles works within the U.S. 
system, the laws are still disjointed.  The current privacy protection 
policy we have does not adequately protect data from getting into the 
wrong hands.   
 
A.  Stronger Enforcement of Data Protection Laws 
 
As recent developments in current events show, the U.S. 
system at present is not equipped to handle breaches of privacy, and 
                                                          
215 See Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 24 (noting that the FTC, states, and 
industry sectors are moving towards a trend that approaches data privacy using the 
“process oriented” legal standard in which an organization will “engage in an 
ongoing and repetitive process that assesses risk, identifies and implements 
responsive security measures, [and] verifies that they are effectively 
implemented.”). 
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there is still more that should be done.  For instance, some companies 
storing clients’ credit card information don’t encrypt their files, 
which is a very basic step that one takes to protect sensitive 
information.  One could make the argument that the U.S. system 
places too much faith in the market, and allowing companies to self-
regulate data protection naturally leads to the problem of conflict of 
interest.  On one hand, businesses are delegated the duty of 
protecting customer information.  On the other hand, businesses need 
to make a profit, and selling information is very lucrative.216  Even if 
a company is not selling information, it lacks incentives to take that 
extra step to provide a sufficient level of data protection.  The U.S. 
model, as it is now, is not practical and doesn’t work.  As Professor 
A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami Law School notes 
in his article “The Death of Privacy?,” the “regulation” part of “self-
regulation” is more-often-than-not overlooked.217  He states that the 
existing plan is unworkable: “It may be that competitive pressures 
might ultimately drive firms to seek privacy certification, but 
currently fewer than 1000 firms participate in either TRUSTe's or 
BBBOnline's programs, which suggests that market pressure to 
participate is weak to nonexistent.”218  Businesses are responsible 
only to themselves, and without an outside force driving change, it is 
difficult to bring about any sort of data protection.  Froomkin further 
adds that because the U.S. endorses self-regulation “without legal 
sanctions to incentivize it or enforce it; it is hard to believe that the 
strategy is anything more than a political device to avoid 
regulation.”219  
It seems then that the problem with the U.S. model is not that 
the data protection laws are flawed; rather, it is the enforcement of 
the laws that is lacking.  It’s not that there is an absence of federal 
laws or state laws protecting data protection, it is non-compliance to 
                                                          
216 David Goldman, Your Phone Company Is Selling Your Personal Data, 
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these laws that is weakening the U.S. model.220  This begs the 
politically charged question of: “Should the government play a 
stronger role in enforcing these laws?”  This question should be 
answered in the affirmative.  One of the most important things we 
should borrow from the EU model is the idea of government 
involvement in data regulation.  Some government involvement is 
needed to provide the data protection that is vital in today’s 
technology-laden society.  This is not a call for total government 
control of data protection regulation, nor is it an argument that we 
must have the same level of government involvement as the one the 
EU model has.  In other words, it is not suggested that the U.S. 
should enact laws or encourage laws that allow for filtering of the 
web, like LOPPSI 2.  This paper only argues that government should 
play a stronger role than the one it has now.  There should be enough 
federal regulation to encourage businesses to provide sufficient data 
security, but not so much regulation that businesses are unnecessarily 
burdened.  Businesses should still maintain a role in data protection 
in the sense that the government should work with businesses and 
listen to feedback. 
It could be argued that more government involvement would 
pose a burden to businesses and corporations.  Admittedly, 
businesses should have the freedom to make their own decisions and 
act in any way that would best serve their shareholders.  However, 
they still owe a duty to their consumers to take reasonable data 
security measures.  More government enforcement would not mean 
that the government would step in to control the decisions companies 
make, it would only mean that companies would have to start 
complying with existing law.  In addition, if the U.S. adopted 
stronger government enforcement without changing or adding any 
new privacy protection laws, the obligation placed on businesses 
would not be that much different than the obligation they now have.     
Lastly, one could suggest that we could divide responsibility 
of rule enforcement between the government and the people.  The 
people could help enforce the various laws in place through their 
right of redress.  This wouldn’t reflect the system that we have now 
because the U.S. is a highly litigious society with a legal system set 
up in a manner that encourages litigation.  The right for a person to 
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have her “day in court” is important.   Class action litigation can pose 
an effective measure for preventing lax data security by companies.  
Although this measure may be less costly than increased government 
involvement, it may not be very effective.  At present, there are 
several statutes under which a private citizen may sue, including 
HIPAA and GLBA.221  In addition, most of the actions that the FTC 
has brought against businesses for failing to provide adequate data 
protection have been based upon section 5 of the FTC Act, and these 
claims are deeply grounded in contract principles.222  In fact, they are 
almost exclusively rooted in contract principles because a person 
doesn’t own his or her personal information, and as of yet, there is 
not a strong constitutional right protecting privacy.  While contract 
law is an effective means of regulating data security, the problem 
with rights under contracts is that such rights can be forfeited by 
agreement.  One can easily imagine a situation where an individual 
must forego data security or a right to sue in order to receive a 
company’s product or business.  This happens quite often now with 
contracts requiring an individual to enter into arbitration, and 
foregoing his or her right to bring suit.  If such a right can be 
contracted away, the whole idea of the right of redress falls on its 
face.  Even though spreading the responsibility of enforcement 
between government and citizens may be a good alternative to 
increased government intervention, in the end, such an idea may fail 
to be effective because the right to sue can be contracted away. 
 
B.  Room for a U.S. Data Protection Agency 
 
In borrowing from the EU model, the U.S. should not only 
increase government enforcement into its policy, it should also form 
a data protection agency. If this were to happen, it would help the 
U.S. model to effectively enforce data protection laws.  One problem 
with the current model is that there are many different divisions, from 
the FTC to NTIA to the ITA to NIST, that handle data protection; 
this despite the fact that what is really needed is one coordinated and 
streamlined agency.  Another problem with the current model is that 
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the two main agencies that handle data protection issues at present, 
the FTC and the Department of Commerce, have other duties 
requiring agency focus, so they have to divide their time among their 
many responsibilities.  Clearly, the FTC and Department of 
Commerce first started handling data protection issues because most 
laws that protect consumer information are aimed at business sectors.  
Thus, it would initially seem that the FTC and Department of 
Commerce are better equipped to handle issues of data protection.  
But we must also keep in mind that these two bodies handle a variety 
of different issues, and it is unlikely that these two agencies will be 
able to adapt quickly to changes in technology.  In order to 
effectively enforce data protection, a lot of time, effort, and 
manpower will be needed.  This may have the effect of spreading 
these two agencies thin.  It will have the result of either detracting 
from their other duties, or they will not be able to effectively enforce 
data protection laws.   
With laws at both the federal and state levels that target 
numerous sectors, an agency with a sole focus on data protection 
would be more adept at identifying and resolving problems.  The red 
tape and inefficiency involved with having multiple data agencies 
effectively maims any enforcement measures that the government 
would take.  Consolidating the data protection tasks into one unit 
would help the government act as a coordinated body.    
So if a data protection agency were formed, what would it 
look like?  An examination of the UK and French data protection 
agencies show that the agency must have teeth.  The easiest way to 
give an agency power is to give it the ability to penalize breaches 
through fines.  Without the power to fine, an agency will not have the 
power it needs to be effective.  While this idea of fining data 
breaches would be a new practice in the U.S., it wouldn’t be much 
different from the accepted U.S. practice of fining corporations for 
breaches of environmental law.223  Thus, it wouldn’t be such a radical 
idea as to be unacceptable to U.S. citizens.  However, like the 
European data agencies, there should be a limit to the amount for 
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which a company can be fined if it fails to provide reasonable data 
protection.  Fines should not be so low as to amount to a slap on the 
wrist, but the data protection agency also should not be given a carte 
blanche and hand out astronomical fines. 
Finally, such an agency must be independent from 
government, because in the end, the agency’s purpose is to look after 
citizens’ rights.  It must be on guard against infringements on such 
rights, whether the stifling of those rights comes from government or 
private parties.  In France, CNIL is so intertwined with government 
that it seems to lose focus on its original purpose of protecting 
citizens’ rights.  It protects citizens from businesses, but many 
perceive the CNIL as inadequately protecting them from government. 
 
C.  Prevention First 
 
Also, like the EU data protection agencies, the main focus of 
the U.S. data protection agency should be to prevent breaches.  
Currently, the FTC and the Department of Commerce only act to 
identify breaches that have already been made rather than identifying 
potential breaches.  In contrast, the ICO as well as CNIL both assess 
company compliance to data protection laws and focus mainly on 
preventing data breaches by ensuring that the rules are being 
followed.  So, in this way, the U.S. policy is more concerned with 
penalizing breaches rather than preventing them through assessments 
and performance reviews, contrary to the EU policy.  Even without a 
data protection agency, the U.S. should still borrow this EU notion of 
prevention.   Data security is becoming more of an issue with courts 
and agencies are applying various laws in new ways.  For instance, 
the FTC’s recent interpretation of FTC Act section 5 as applying to 
security breaches as an unfair trade practice224 was a novel approach 
that was not communicated to companies.  If companies had been put 
on notice, it is possible that there may have been changes that would 
have benefitted consumers and the companies that were in breach of 
this “unfair trade practice.”  In light of this, it would be helpful for 
companies to be warned before the law is applied in a novel way.  If 
agencies were focused on prevention and performing assessments, 
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companies would have notice about what is expected of them and, 
hopefully, would be less susceptible to breaching data security laws. 
 
VII.  POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF “MIDDLE ROAD” CONCEPT 
 
Even though this “middle-road” idea may seem odd 
considering that the U.S. and EU models approach data protection 
from different ends of the spectrum, the idea will be workable.  It is 
important to note that the two models are considered as radically 
different from each other only because the EU provides that privacy 
is a fundamental right while the U.S. does not.  So, even though the 
EU policy may seem to conflict with U.S. policy, the U.S. will still 
be able to integrate some EU ideas into its current policy without 
creating contradictions.   
If the U.S. were to adopt the EU’s stance on government 
intervention, create a data protection agency, and focus on prevention 
of data breaches, the new changes would translate to the U.S. system.  
Some may argue that this would give too much control to the 
government, but one must keep in mind that some sacrifices have to 
be made in order to obtain benefits.  It all boils down to the task of 
balancing the value of data protection against the value of moderate 
governmental intrusion.  Thus far, the U.S. policy has tried to find a 
way in which it will not have to make any sacrifices—attempting to 
find a way in which it can have a hands-off government and adequate 
data protection.  This desire to have the best of both worlds simply 
isn’t feasible and proof that it isn’t feasible lies in the state of U.S. 
data protection today.  Self-regulation overly burdens companies 
because it expects a business to act as a neutral party to protect 
customer rights, even though businesses are anything but an 
indifferent party.  Such an approach is not practical. 
In balancing the right of data privacy protection against that 
of governmental intrusion, we must look at the level of governmental 
intrusion that is acceptable in the U.S.  If the U.S. were to step in 
with a data protection agency and increase its regulation of data 
security, it wouldn’t be any different from the FCC stepping in and 
regulating media225 or the FTC regulating consumer rights.  
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Weighing this against protection of sensitive information, it would 
seem that data protection might outweigh the accepted practice of 
moderate government intrusion.  Consumer information is highly 
sensitive and may create lasting problems if it gets into the wrong 
hands.  In addition, modern technology allows information to be 
gathered quickly and in vast amounts.  The gravity of harm that could 
be done to a multitude of people may outweigh the accepted practice 
of government regulation.  Further, while heavier enforcement than 
the current level will not be overly welcome, it wouldn’t be that great 
of a departure from our current system.226  The FTC has been 
increasing its regulation of data protection, so an increase in 
enforcement will not vary greatly from the way the system runs now.   
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
No system is perfect and the U.S. model of data protection is 
not an exception.  However, one can be encouraged that the U.S. has 
a strong framework upon which to build.  While we do not need to 
duplicate the EU model, there are several portions of the European 
model that we should borrow.  With stronger enforcement and early 
detection of mistakes in data security, the U.S. will have a system 
that provides its citizens with the informational security that is 
needed in today’s ever-changing world. 
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